

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7953

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 4 BONN 14721

EUR/CE FOR GEORGE

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: ETRD GW

SUBJECT: CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR  
HILLENBRAND

1. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FROM MINISTER PRESIDENT STOLTENBERG OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN TO SPEAK AT THE HERMAN EHLERS ACADEMY IN KIEL ON OCTOBER 17. THE TITLE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH IS "THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS." THE SPEECH WILL BE DELIVERED IN GERMAN, WITH BOTH ENGLISH AND GERMAN TEXTS AVAILABLE TO THOSE ATTENDING INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL GERMAN PRESS. REQUEST DEPARTMENT CLEARANCE BY COB IN BONN OCTOBER 15 TO ALLOW TIME FOR THE TRANSLATION AND REPRODUCTION OF THE SPEECH.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DRAFT

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

HERMANN-EHLERS-AKADEMIE, KIEL, I.P.M., WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1973

I SHOULD LIKE FIRST TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE FOR THE INVITATION TO JOIN YOU THIS EVENING HERE IN KIEL.

IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT I ADDRESS MYSELF TO THE QUESTION OF  
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THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. I AM GLAD TO DO SO.  
IT IS A SUBJECT IMPORTANT AT ANY TIME BUT OF PARTICULAR INTEREST AND  
TIMELESS NOW IN THIS "YEAR OF EUROPE" -- A YEAR CLEARLY INTENDED TO S  
ET

IN MOTION FORCES LASTING MANY YEARS.

I THINK IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY BEFORE A GROUP SUCH AS THIS TO DO MORE THAN ALLUDE TO THE VITAL INTEREST IN THIS RELATIONSHIP WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE HAD FOR MORE THAN A QUARTER CENTURY NOW. NOR NEED I DWELL ON THE POSITIVE RESULTS FROM THE PATTENS OF COOPERATION WE HAVE DEVELOPED.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE HAS, TO BE SURE, BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONSTANT EXAMINATION AND REVIEW FOR MANY YEARS, SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS OF SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ALL OF US. BUT THE PRESENT DISCUSSION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP IS DIFFERENT THAN THOSE IN THE PAST. WE ARE NOW ENGAGED WITH OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS IN A DIALOGUE WHICH HAS FOR US THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. ITS PURPOSE IS TO WORK OUT PRINCIPLES WHICH UNDERLIE OUR RELATIONSHIP TODAY.

THE GREAT BRITISH HISTORIAN, ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, ONCE OBSERVED, "THOSE SOCIETIES WHICH CANNOT COMBINE REVERENCE TO THEIR SYMBOLS WITH FREEDOM OF REVISION MUST ULTIMATELY DECAY." THAT MAY BE TRUE ALSO OF ALLIANCES, WHICH, LACKING THE HISTORIC AND TRADITIONAL SYMBOLS OF NATIONSTATES, MUST BE EVEN MORE VULNERABLE TO DECAY. OUR PRESENT UNDERTAKING IN THIS DIALOGUE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE IS TO IDENTIFY THOSE VALUES IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WHICH ARE LASTING AND DURABLE AND TO REVISE THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH NEED TO BE BROUGHT INTO HARMONY WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PREVAIL TODAY. WE HOPE IN THIS WAY TO GIVE A NEW IMPETUS TO OUR RELATIONSHIP AND TO REAFFIRM ITS STRENGTH AND VITALITY.

THIS EFFORT ALONE WOULD BE ONE OF HISTORIC PROPORTIONS. BUT ITS SIGNIFICANCE IS ENHANCED BY THE FACT THAT IT IS BEING UNDERTAKEN AT A TIME WHEN THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION HAS ALSO REACHED AN HISTORIC POINT. FOR THE EUROPEAN NINE ARE FOR THE FIRST TIME ATTEMPTING TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON A POLITICAL MATTER IN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. WE IN THE UNITED STATES OF COURSE HAVE CONSISTENTLY UNCLASSIFIED

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SUPPORTED THE MOVEMENT TOWARD EUROPEAN UNITY AND THE MERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN IDENTITY. IT IS THEREFORE SINGULARLY APPROPRIATE THAT THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT EFFORT BY A UNITING EUROPE TO SPEAK WITH ONE POLITICAL VOICE SHOULD BE IN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES.

I FIND IT UNFORTUNATE THAT SOME OF THE REPORTS WHICH WE READ ABOUT THIS PROCESS CAST IT IN TERMS OF THE BOXING ARENA OR THE FOOTBALL STADIUM. WE ARE INFORMED WHO HAS SCORED A POINT OFF WHOM AND WHO IS WINNING AND WHO LOSING. THIS CANNOT BUT CREATE A FALSE IMPRESSION OF THE PROCESS. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN AN ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP IN THIS DIALOGUE WITH EUROPE. NOR DO I THINK OUR PARTNERS

IN THIS DIALOGUE CONSIDER IT AS SUCH. THIS IS A NEW EXPERIENCE FOR BOTH SIDES. GIVEN THAT FACT, I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY WE ARE NOT DOING AT ALL BADLY.

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PARALLEL TO THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMUNITY, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IS HOLDING DISCUSSION OF FUTURE ALLIED RELATIONSHIPS DEALING WITH SECURITY. WE HEAR MUCH LESS OF THIS, PERHAPS BECAUSE AFTER TWENTY YEARS WE FIND DISCUSSIONS IN THE ALLIANCE ON THESE QUESTIONS SCARCELY ARE A NOVELTY.

IN ADDITION, TO THE DIALOGUE TAKING PLACE IN THESE TWO FORA, OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS ARE IN PROCESS WHICH WILL HAVE IMPORTANT EFFECTS ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. A NEW PERIOD OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY INVOLVING EAST AND WEST HAS BEGUN, CROWDING ON THE HEELS OF AN ERA OF INTENSE BILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE PLAYED CENTRAL ROLES. WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT NEGOTIATION CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY SYSTEM SINCE BRETTON WOODS TWENTY-NINE YEARS AGO. WE HAVE ONLY A MONTH AGO BEGUN THE MOST IMPORTANT TRADE NEGOTIATION SINCE THE KENNEDY ROUND OF A DECADE AGO. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUE THEIR TALKS AIMED AT ACHIEVING A SECOND ROUND OF AGREEMENTS ON CONTROL OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

REMINDE US OF HOW FRAGILE STILL IS THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE.

THUS, WE SEE THE CONFLUENCE OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT CURRENTS, ALL OF WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT THE FUTURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND ON WHICH WE ARE FACED WITH DECISIONS. I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE A FEW MINUTES TO SKETCH FOR YOU HOW WE AMERICANS VIEW THE WORLD IN WHICH THESE DECISIONS

ARE BEING CONTEMPLATED AND TAKEN.

AS WE LOOK AT THIS WORLD, WE SEE THAT IT HAS CHANGED IN FUNDAMENTAL UNCLASSIFIED

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WAYS FROM THAT WORLD OF THE LATE 1940'S IN WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED MANY OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES WHICH CONTINUE UNTIL TODAY IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE SEE AN ALTERED WORLD OF EVOLVING POWER CENTERS. THERE IS THE SOVIET UNION, A POLITICAL-MILITARY SUPERPOWER, WITH GREAT

OVERALL MACRO-ECONOMIC POWER BUT WITH SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN MANY AREAS OF ITS ECONOMY. THERE IS THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF NINE HISTORIC STATES, 250 MILLION PEOPLE AND A GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF \$700 MILLION, A COMMUNITY WHICH IS DETERMINED TO ADVANCE BY 1980 TOWARD

A STILL-TO-BE-DEFINED UNION, BUT WHICH IN OTHER FIELDS TAKE DECISIONS AS NATIONAL STATES RATHER THAN IN COMMON. THERE IS CHINA, A GIANT IN POPULATION, WITH ANCIENT TRADITIONS AND MANY OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF MODERN

MILITARY MIGHT BUT WHICH IS STILL IN MANY WAYS CAUGHT UP IN THE POVERTY

AND TRADITIONAL WAYS OF ASIA. FOURTH, THERE IS JAPAN, AN ECONOMIC SUPER-POWER WHICH FOR HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REASONS HAS REFRAINED FROM

SEEKING GREAT MILITARY POWER. AND THERE IS OF COURSE THE UNITED STATES.

AND BEYOND THESE FIVE GREAT BUT DIVERSE CENTERS OF POWER IS THE DEVELOPING

WORLD, WHOSE HUGE PROBLEMS POSE TO THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD POLITICAL,

ECONOMIC AND MORAL CHALLENGES WHICH MUST BE FACED.

AS A NEW ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE IN 1969, IT SOUGHT TO TAKE STOCK BOTH OF THE THREATS AND OF THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH RESULTED FROM THE INTERRELATIONS AMONG THESE CENTERS OF POWER AND TO CHANGE THE

PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY TO ADAPT IT TO CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WAS DOMINATED BY THE SEEMINGLY INTRACTABLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE TWO MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS. WITH DIFFERING IDEOLOGIES,

WITH GLOBAL INTERESTS AND WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF COALITIONS OF OPPOSING STATES, THE BASIC PATTERN OF THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS A TENSE JOCKEYING FOR TACTICAL ADVANTAGES AROUND THE GLOBE. WITH RESPECT TO CHINA, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD INHERITED TWO DECADES OF MUTUAL UNCLASSIFIED

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STRANGEMENT AND HOSTILITY. WHILE THERE COULD BE NO STABLE ORDER IN ASIA OR IN THE WORLD WHILE CHINA REMAINED OUTSIDE AND HOSTILE, WE HAD NO RELATIONSHIP AT ALL WITH IT. THE MONOLITHIC CHALLENGE WE HAD SEEN IN THE COMBINATION OF SOVIET AND CHINESE POWER HAD DISSOLVED IN THE ACID OF NATIONALISM AND IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTE. OUR PRINCIPAL ALLIANCES WITH WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN NEEDED ADJUSTMENT, TO REFLECT THE FACT THEY HAD BECOME ECONOMIC GIANTS WITH GROWING POLITICAL WEIGHT AND CONFIDENCE. THROUGH THE POSTWAR PERIOD OUR BONDS WITH EUROPE HAD RESTED ON AMERICAN PRESCRIPTIONS AS WELL

AS RESOURCES. WE PROVIDED MUCH OF THE LEADERSHIP AND PLANNING FOR COMMON DEFENSE. WE TOOK THE DIPLOMATIC LEAD. THE DOLLAR WAS UNCHALLENGED. BUT, BY 1969, THE TIDE WAS CHANGING, FLOWING NOW TOWARD GREATER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASSERTIVENESS BY OUR ALLIES. EUROPEAN UNITY, WE HAD ALWAYS AND STILL DO ENCOURAGE, WAS NONETHELESS RAISING NEW ISSUES IN ATLANTIC RELATIONS. THE MONETARY AND TRADE FRAME-

WORKS WERE SHOWING EFFECTS OF STRAIN. SIMILARLY, IN THE CASE OF JAPAN,

THE EARLIER PATERNALISM OF THE U.S.- JAPANESE RELATIONS WAS NO LONGER SUITED TO NEW CONDITIONS.

WE FOUND ALSO THAT THE CONTEXT FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WAS FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED. THE SOVIET UNION GAINED A BALANCE IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. OUR DEFENSE EFFORT REMAINED DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE IN COMPARISON TO THAT OF OUR ALLIES. THE THREAT FROM POTENTIAL ENEMIES HAD BECOME MORE AMBIGUOUS. THESE CHANGES, PLUS SPIRALING MILITARY COSTS AND DOMESTIC DEMANDS, PROMPTED RE-EXAMINATION OF OUR DEFENSE DOCTRINES AND POSTURE. THEY GAVE EMPHASIS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL AS AN ELEMENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY. THEY ALSO LED SOME IN MY COUNTRY TO CALL FOR POLICIES THAT WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE WORLD SAFETY AND STABILITY.

WE FACED NEW PRESSURES AT HOME, AS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHICH HAD SUPPORTED THE BURDENS OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP FOR ALMOST THREE DECADES, SHOWED A WANING ENTHUSIASM. OUR POLICIES NEEDED CHANGE, NOT ONLY TO MATCH NEW REALITIES IN THE WORLD BUT ALSO TO MEET A NEW MOOD IN AMERICA. MANY AMERICANS NO LONGER WERE WILLING TO SUPPORT THE SWEEPING RANGE OF OUR POSTWAR ROLE, AND INSTEAD WERE SAYING THAT UNCLASSIFIED

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IT HAD DRAINED OUR FINANCIAL RESERVES AND WERE DEMANDING THAT OUR FRIENDS DO MORE.

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THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION DETERMINED TO FORGE NEW POLICIES THAT WOULD CORRESPOND TO SIGNIFICANT ALTERATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAND -  
SCAPE AND WOULD CLEAR AWAY SOME VESTIGES OF THE PAST. AS WE MOVED FROM A  
BIPOLAR WORLD CHARACTERIZED BY AMERICAN PREDOMINANCE TO A MULTIPOLAR WORLD OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES, WE FOCUSED ON THREE PRIMORDIAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES -- BUILDING A FIRMER STRUCTURE OF PEACE WITH OUR ADVERSARIES, SHAPING A MORE DURABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL TIES WITH OUR FRIENDS, AND ENGAGING THE SUPPORT OF OUR DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY. WE SEE THESE THREE ENGAGEMENTS AS BEING DYNAMICALLY RELATED, AS THERE CAN BE NO BROAD LEGITIMACY FOR OR CONSENSUS CONCERNING A PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL ORDER THAT DOES NOT REST  
IN THE WEST ON THE BASES OF ALLIED AND PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING.

WE BEGAN WITH THE CONVICTION, WHICH REMAINS FUNDAMENTAL, THAT A MAJOR AMERICAN COMMITMENT IN THE WORLD WAS INDISPENSABLE. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF EUROPE, FOR WE CONTINUED TO VIEW THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AS THE VERY FULCRUM OF WESTERN SECURITY AND PROSPERITY. AN AMERICAN ROLE IN THE WORLD IS A MATTER OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. IT ALSO IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF PEACE. BUT WE RECOGNIZED THAT ALTERED CONDITIONS DEMANDED THAT WE MOVE FROM A PATERNAL MISSION FOR OTHERS TO A COOPERATIVE MISSION WITH OTHERS. IT WAS OUR CONVICTION THAT, IN AN AGE OF INTERNATIONAL PLURALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE, PEACE CANNOT DEPEND SOLELY ON THE TENSE AND UNEASY EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN TWO HOSTILE NUCLEAR GIANTS.

IN OUR APPROACH TO OUR ADVERSARIES, WE SOUGHT, IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S WELL-KNOWN PHRASE, TO MOVE FROM AN ERA OF CONFRONTATION TO AN UNCLASSIFIED

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ERA OF NEGOTIATION, THAT IS, TO SUPPLEMENT THE SECURITY OF MUTUAL MILITARY MIGHT WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS OF AN INNOVATIVE DIPLOMACY. CERTAIN PRECEPTS GOVERNED THIS POLICY. WE WERE INTERESTED IN CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS TO LEAD TO SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS. WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EPHEMERAL IMPROVEMENTS IN ATMOSPHERICS. WE SOUGHT TO WORK WITH MOSCOW ON A BROAD FRONT, IN THE BELIEF THAT PROGRESS IN ONE AREA WOULD ENCOURAGE IT IN OTHERS. WE SOUGHT TO CREATE VESTED INTERESTS IN BOTH SIDES IN RESTRAINT AND THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, WHICH REQUIRED A REDUCTION OF TACTICAL MANEUVERING TO SEIZE ADVANTAGES. WE WOULD JUDGE SOVIET ACTIONS RATHER THAN WORDS, WE DECIDED

THE BASIC TEST AND CRITERION WAS TO BE A WILLINGNESS TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT.

THE RESULTS OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS OF THESE RATHER FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS CONCERNING THE COURSE OF AMERICAN POLICY ARE WELL-KNOWN TO YOU, I AM SURE. THEY INCLUDE THE PRESIDENT'S DRAMATIC TRIPS TO PEKING AND TO MOSCOW, THE ENDING OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN VIETNAM, THE SALT I AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET

UNION ON THE CONTROL OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. IN EUROPE, WE SOUGHT, IN CONCERT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, TO WORK FOR A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND IN GERMANY. THE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WHICH RESULTED FROM THIS PROCESS -- THOSE BETWEEN BONN AND MOSCOW AND WARSAW AND THE FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT ON BERLIN -- CLEARED THE PATH ON A NEW CHAPTER OF DETENTE THIS NEW MULTILATERAL PHASE SEEKS TO ADDRESS THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. ITS INSTRUMENTALITIES ARE THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE -- KNOWN AS CSCE -- AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, OR MBFR. CSCE IS NOW IN ITS SECOND STAGE IN GENEVA, WITH COMMITTEES AT WORK DRAWING UP DOCUMENTS ELATING TO ITS THREE MAIN AGENDA "BASKETS," DEALING WITH SECURITY IN EUROPE, COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE COMPLEX WHICH HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS. I BELIEVE IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF CSCE RELATES TO THAT FINAL COMPLEX. WE IN THE WEST ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO ACHIEVING CONCRETE RESULTS RATHER THAN MERE ATMOSPHERICS IN CSCE IN GENERAL, AND IN THE FIELD OF FREER MOVEMENT IN PARTICULAR. IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE MUST RESULT

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IN TANGIBLE HUMAN GAINS AND NOT SIMPLY UNDERSTANDINGS AMONG GOVERNMENTS.

WHILE OUR GOALS IN CSCE COVER A WIDE FIELD, THEY TOUCH ONLY TANGENTIALLY ON MILITARY MATTERS. AFTER THE SECURITY CONFERENCE IS HOSTORY, THE SAME NUMBER OF DIVISIONS OF MILITARY FORCES WOULD BE RANGED ALONG THE DEMARCATION LINES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

IT HAS BEEN THE U.S. AND ALLIED VIEW, SINCE THE 1967 REYKJAVIK NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, THAT A SERIOUS EFFORT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO NEGOTIATE A MUTUAL AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF THESE RIVAL FORCES. AS WE MOVED IN OTHER FIELDS FROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION, THE ARGUMENTS FAVORING SUCH NEGOTIATIONS BECAME EVEN MORE COMPELLING.

AFTER LAENGTHY DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES AND PREPARATORY TALKS, THE NINETEEN PARTICIPATING STATES ARE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS OCTOBER 30 IN VIENNA ON --AND I QUOTE THE AGREED TITLE OF THE NEGOTIATION -- "MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE." MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THE ABSENCE IN THIS TITLE OF THE TERM "BALANCE." WE ARE NOT CONCERNED BY THIS OMISSION FROM THE AGREED DESCRIPTION. WE INTEND TO ADVANCE OUR PROPOSITIONS, INCLUDING THE CONCEPT THAT, PURSUANT TO THE AGREED PRICIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, GEOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO ASSURE A BALANCED AND FAIR RESULT. AND WE ARE DETERMINED THAT THE RESULTS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS MUST MEET THE ELEMENTAL TEST OF PRESERVING AND ADVANCING WESTERN SECURITY.

THESE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS ARE A DEPARTURE FROM AN EARLIER

PATTERN OF COLD WAR AND AIM AT THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW, DURABLE AND PEACEFUL CONSENSUS. THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THESE ENDEAVORS AND IN WHAT EMERGES FROM THEM. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE SEARCH FOR PEACE WITH LONGTIME ADVERSARIES HAS BEEN POSSIBLE ONLY ON THE STRENGTH OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AS WELLAS THE ECONOMIC POWER OF THE WEST. IN OUR VIEW, NEGOTIATION WITH ADVERSARIES TO DISSIPATE DIFFERENCES DOES NOT, INDEED CANNOT, ALTER OUR MORE FUNDAMENTAL TIES WITH FRIENDS. OUR BONDS WITH CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN ALLIES OF NATO REMAIN THE VERY CORNERSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. THEY REFLECT SHARED VALUES AND PURPOSE, INVOLVE MAJOR ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND PROVIDE THE SECURE FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BASE NEGOTIATIONS.

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IT IS INSTRUCTIVE, IN THIS REGARD, TO CONSIDER THE VERY DIFFERENT GOALS OF AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE. WITH THE S  
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THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO ADOPT A BROAD POLITICAL APPROACH THAT DOES JUSTICE OT OUR OVERRIDING POLITICAL INTEREST IN AN OPEN AND BALANCED TRADING ORDER WITH BOTH EUROPE AND JAPAN. THIS IS THE SPIRIT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRADE BILL AND OF OUR STRATEGY IN THE TRADE AND MONETARY TALKS. WE SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS NOT AS A TEST OF STRENGTH, BUT AS A TEST OF JOINT STATESMANSHIP.

ATLANTIC UNITY HAS ALWAYS COME MOST NATURALLY IN THE FIELD OF DEFENSE. FOR MANY YEARS THE MILITARY THREATS TO EUROPE WERE UN-AMBIGUOUS. THE REQUIREMENTS TO MEET THEM WERE GENERALLY AGREED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC, AND AMERICA'S RESPONSIBILITY WAS PREEMINENT AND OBVIOUS. TODAY WE REMAIN UNITED ON THE OBJECTIVE OF COLLECTIVE, FORWARD DEFENSE, THROUGH OUR AGREED ALLIED POLICY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. BUT WE FACE THE NEW CHALLENGE OF MAINTAINING IT UNDER RADICALLY CHANGED STRATEGIC CONDITIONS AND WITH THE NEW OPPORTUNITY OF ENHANCING OUR SECURITY THROUGH NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS OF FORCE.



THE COLLECTIVE ABILITY TO RESIST ATTACK IN WESTERN EUROPE BY MEANS FLEXIBLE RESPONSES HAS BECOME CENTRAL TO A RATIONAL STRATEGY AND CRUCIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. FOR THIS REASON THE UNITED STATES

HAS MAINTAINED SUBSTANTIAL CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE AND OUR NATO ALLIES HAVE EMBARKED ON A SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THEIR OWN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF FLEXIBILITY ARE COMPLEX AND EXPENSIVE. FLEXIBILITY BY ITS NATURE REQUIRES SENSITIVITY TO NEW CONDITIONS  
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AND CONTINUAL CONSULTATION AMONG THE ALLIES TO RESPOND TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. AND WE MUST GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE DEFENSE POSTURE THAT OUR STRATEGY DEFINES.

TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY BALANCE THAT HAS ENSURED STABILITY IN EUROPE FOR 25 YEARS, THE ALLIANCE HAS BEGUN TO ADDRESS THESE NEEDS AND TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON OUR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. THIS TASK IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS HAS GIVEN NEW IMPETUS TO ARGUMENTS THAT IT IS SAFE TO BEGIN REDUCING FORCES UNILATERALLY. AND UNBRIDLED ECONOMIC COMPETITION CAN SAP THE IMPULSE FOR COMMON DEFENSE. ALL GOVERNMENTS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE FACE MAJOR CHALLENGE IN EDUCATING THEIR PEOPLE TO THE REALITIES OF SECURITY IN THE 1970'S. BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO SUCCEED.

ACCORDINGLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED THAT AMERICA REMAINS COMMITTED TO DOING ITS FAIR SHARE IN ATLANTIC DEFENSE. HE IS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS OF U.S. FORCES FROM EUROPE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WE OWE TO OUR PEOPLES A RATIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE, AT THE SAFEST MINIMUM SIZE AND COST, WITH ALLIED BURDENS EQUITABLY SHARED.

WITH SUCH A POSTURE, WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO ENGAGE OUR ADVERSARIES INTELLIGENTLY IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE PREPARATION OF THESE MBFR TALKS WITHIN THE NATO ALLIANCE HAS INVOLVED THE CLOSEST CONSULTATIONS -- AS HAS BEEN THE CASE IN OTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EAST. AND AS SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS SAID, "NO FORMULA FOR REDUCTIONS IS DEFENSIBLE -- WHATEVER ITS DOMESTIC APPEAL OR POLITICALLY RATIONAL -- IF IT UNDERMINES SECURITY."

IN SHORT, OUR OBJECTIVE IN THE DIALOGUE ON DEFENSE IS A NEW CONSENSUS ON SECURITY ADDRESSED TO NEW CONDITIONS AND TO THE HOPEFUL NEW POSSIBILITIES OF EFFECTIVE ARMS LIMITATION.

NONETHELESS, AS A CAREFUL READER OF THE NEWSPAPERS WILL HAVE

DISCERNED, THERE IS SOME UNEASINESS IN WESTERN EUROPE THAT "SUPERPOWER

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DIPLOMACY" MIGHT SACRIFIC THE INTERESTS OF TRADITIONAL ALLIES AND OTHER FRIENDS. I CAN ONLY ASSURE YOU THAT THIS WILL NOT BE THE CASE AND THAT, IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S WORDS, "THERE CAN BE NO HIGHER U.S. OBJECTIVE THAN THE STRENGTHENING OF UR ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP."

ALL OF THIS UNDERLINES THE NECESSITY TO ARTICULATE A CLEAR SET OF COMMON OBJECTIVES TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES. ONCE THAT IS ACCOMPLISHED

, IT WILL BE QUITE FEASIBLE, INDEED DESIRABLE, FOR THE SEVERAL ALLIES TO

PURSUE THESE GOALS WITH TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY.

WE DO NOT NEED TO AGREE ON ALL POLICIES, IN MANY AREAS OF THE WORLD OUR APPROACHES WILL DIFFER, ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE OF EUROPE. BUT WE DO REQUIRE AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT SHOULD BE DONE JOINTLY AND OF THE LIMITS WE SHOULD IMPOSE ON THE SCOPE OF OUR AUTONOMY.

WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF BUYING AN ILLUSORY TRANQUILITY AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR FRIENDS. THE UNITED STATES WILL NEVER KNOWINGLY SACRIFIC THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS. BUT THE PERCEPTION OF COMMON INTERESTS

IS NOT AUTOMATIC; IT REQUIRES CONSTANT REDEFINITION. THE RELAXATION OF

TENSIONS TO WHICH WE ARE COMMITTED MAKES ALLIED COHESION INDISPENSIBLE

YET MORE DIFFICULT. WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE MOMENTUM OF DETENTE IS MAINTAINED BY COMMON OBJECTIVES RATHER THAN BY DRIFT, EXCAPISM OR COMPLACENCY.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I HAVE REACHED THE END OF MY REMARKS AND I HAVE SAID VERY LITTLE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA. I THOUGHT IT MORE USEFUL TO SPEND THIS TIME DISCUSSING THE PERCEPTIONS WE HAVE OF THE CONTAXT IN WHICH WILL BE TAKEN THE DECISIONS WHICH WILL HAVE A DECISIVE EFFECT ON THAT FUTURE. IT MAY NOT BE TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT WE ARE AT A TIME NOT UNLIKE

THAT IN THE LATE 1940'S AND EARLY 1950'S, WHEN WE SET THE COURSE FOR YEARS TO COME. I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A COMPELLING CASE FOR CONTINUED UNITY IN THE WEST, TO INSURE PEACE AND SECURITY, TO INSURE THE CONTINUATION OF OUR PROSPERITY, TO ASSURE THAT OUR EFFORTS FOR DETENTE YIELD THE RESULTS WE SEEK. AND I BELIEVE  
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THAT THE DECISIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN THE WEST WHICH WILL EMBUE OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP WITH NEW VITALITY AND STRENGTH. HILLENBRAND

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 11 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
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**Draft Date:** 11 OCT 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
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**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Page Count:** 10  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** kellerpr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 14 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <14-Aug-2001 by phillir0>; APPROVED <28-Aug-2001 by kellerpr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
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**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
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**TAGS:** ETRD, GE  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005